

present the facts as clearly as possible and leave judgments on strategy and tactics to persons better qualified to form them. Macaulay avoids the mistake of showing how battles ought to have been fought, but does not always state with sufficient clearness how they were fought. In this respect he has been compared, to his disadvantage, with Thiers. A critic of the historian of Napoleon's campaigns observes :

L'art de M. Thiers, ici comme dans son style, se cache si bien, qu'on est en danger de ne pas assez le sentir. On a besoin, pour apprecier tout le talent deploye par Fauteur, d'appeler a son aide la reflexion et la comparaison. Prenons, par exemple, Tun des plus brillants de nos historiens modernes ; ouvrons Macaulay, et parcourons ces tableaux pales et confus qu'il retrace des qu'il s'agit de decrire des operations militaires : lisons sa victoire de La Boyne ou sa defaite de Nerwinde, et nous reconnaitrons aussitot la superiorite de l'ecrivain frangais.¹

One cannot agree that Macaulay's battles are colourless, but they are certainly less clear than those of Thiers because the details are not given with equal precision. Macaulay regarded such details as dull. 'I turned over/ he writes in his diary, ' the new volumes of Thiers's book ; the Austrian campaign of 1809. It is heavy. I hope that my volumes will be more attractive reading/ ²

Macaulay does not deal comprehensively with the story

of the army's revolt against James II. In the strictest sense of the words it was not a military revolt. It was not dictated by professional interests ; no desire for laxer discipline or more pay had any part in producing it, nor were the

¹Edmond Scherer, *Etudes critiques sur la litterature contemporaine* (1863), i. 145-6.

²July 1852. Trevelyan, ii. 315.